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The Countries’ Relation Formation
Problem: I and II
Yuke Li and A. Stephen Morse
Abstract: This paper integrates the studies of various countries’ behaviors, e.g., waging wars
and entering into military alliances, into a general framework of countries’ relation formation,
which consists of two components, i.e., a static game and a dynamical system. Aside from
being a stand-alone framework itself, this paper can also be seen as a necessary extension of
a recently developed countries’ power allocation game in Li and Morse [2017]. We establish
certain theoretical results, such as pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence in the static game,
and propose several applications of interest made possible by combining both frameworks of
countries’ power allocation and relation formation.
Keywords: relation formation, dynamical system, alliances, great powers’ politics
1. INTRODUCTION
Countries pursue changes in their relations all of the
time. A country’s entering into a military alliance or any
form of cooperative ventures with other countries can be
regarded as its formation of friend relations with them;
A country’s making threats to use force, escalating a
militarized conflict, or declaring a war on other countries,
can be regarded as its formation of adversary relations
with them. Even a country’s cancellation of these said
relations with other countries, e.g., withdrawing from a
military alliance, can be regarded as its formation of a
“null” relation with them.
We summarize the above behaviors into countries’ relation
formation. With another, a country can form:
(1) a “friend” relation, which ranges from formal military
alliances to informal commitments;
(2) an “adversary” relation, which ranges from wars to
threats of use of force;
(3) a “null” relation, which implies no specific cooper-
ative or conflictual elements. As mentioned, a null
relation could be formed through canceling an exist-
ing friend relation (e.g., canceling the alignment) or
adversary relation (e.g., having a ceasefire).
Motivated by the fact that a country may make the joint
decisions about choosing its allies and adversaries, such
as Germany signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact with
the Soviet Union shortly before invading Poland, we make
another abstraction that a country simultaneously forms
different types of relations with different countries.
We thus unify the studies of multiple types of countries’
relation formation behaviors in a single theoretical frame-
work. The existing literature usually focuses on either
countries’ formation of friend relations (i.e., alliance forma-
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tion) by taking the adversary relations among them (i.e.,
wars) as given (e.g., Smith [1995]) or their formation of
adversary relations (i.e., causes of wars) by taking friend
relations among them (i.e., alliances) as given (e.g., Leeds
[2003b]).
Adapted from Chapter 3 of Li [2017], this framework
consists of two models, a static game and a dynamical
system, which share the same setup, i.e., the same set
of assumptions about countries (e.g., their strategies of
forming relations, and the realistic rules governing rela-
tion formation), discussed in Section 2. Section 3.1 and
Section 3.2 follow up by respectively developing the two
models.
Next we argue in Section 4 why the framework of countries’
relation formation is also a necessary extension of coun-
tries’ power allocation game in networked international
environments in Li and Morse [2017]. Intuitively, countries
change the relations to change the international environ-
ments toward where they can more easily pursue their
targets with power allocation. Therefore, the outcomes
from the power allocation games in different environments
thus provide a valid rationale for assessing the extent
to which countries will prefer the new environment after
changing their relations. And we formalize this rationale
using a set of “basic choice axioms” that should be innate
to any country’s preferences for different “relation config-
urations” (which consist of the relations of all countries)
formed as a result of their relation formation behaviors.
Lastly, we discuss two topics — alliance politics and great
powers’ optimal network design — as direct applications of
the combination of the two frameworks of countries’ power
allocation and relation formation in Section 5.
2. SETUP
As in Li and Morse [2017], there is a collection C of
n countries, labeled 1, 2, ..., n; let the set of labels be
n = {1, 2, 3, ..., n}. Any country i ∈ n has a linking
strategy, which is to choose a relation out of the three
possibilities, a friend relation, an adversary relation or a
null relation, to be formed with every other country. A
vector Li = [lij ]
1×n ∈ Li, describes its linking strategy,
where
(1) lij = friend or adversary means country i “links”
with j to establish a friend relation or an adversary
relation.
(2) If lij = null means country i “unlinks” with j, which
can also be regarded a special form of linking.
(3) lii = self by default.
Country i’s linking strategy set is Li, whose cardinality
is 3n−1. The Cartesian product of all countries’ linking
strategy sets is the linking matrices set, L =
∏n
i=1 Li,
whose cardinality is |L| = 3n(n−1).
By a relation configuration we mean a configuration of the
relations among all countries in n. A relation configuration
is represented by a symmetric matrix R = [rij ]
n×n, where
rii = self, rij ∈ {friend, adversary, null}, and rij = rji.
The relation configurations set is denoted as R, whose
cardinality is 3n(n−1)/2.
We now provide below the common-sense rules of how two
countries’ linking strategies give rise to one of the three
relations between them. For instance, bilateral linking by
the two countries toward each other is both necessary
and sufficient for them to form a friend relation; however,
unilateral linking by one of the two countries toward the
other is already sufficient for forming an adversary relation
between them. Formally, a relation function τ : L → R
maps a linking matrix L ∈ L to a relation configuration
R ∈ R based on the following assumptions:
(1) rij = rji = friend if and only if lij = lji = friend.
(2) rij = rji = adversary if and only if lij = adversary,
or lji = adversary or both.
(3) rij = rji = null if and only if lij = null and
lji 6= adversary, or lji = null and lij 6= adversary
or both.
Any country i ∈ n ranks over all possible relation con-
figurations in R using a valid total order. We define this
ranking as its preferences for relation configurations, writ-
ten formally as (R,4). For country i, given any R, Rˆ ∈ R,
R 4 Rˆ means that country i weakly prefers Rˆ over R, i.e.,
strictly preferring Rˆ over R (R ≺ Rˆ) or being indifferent
between them (R ∼ Rˆ).
3. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 Static Game
In the static game of interest, any country i simultaneously
and optimally picks its linking strategy Li in order to form
relations with other countries based on its preferences for
the relation configurations that form, (R,4). The game
can be denoted as the collection of the aforementioned
parameters, i.e., Σ = {C,L, τ,R,4}. A complete informa-
tion framework is also assumed, where countries have full
knowledge of the elements in {C,L, τ,R,4}.
An equilibrium relation configuration emerges if and only
if every country’s linking strategy is in best response to one
another, i.e., no one strictly benefits by changing its own
linking strategy. A linking matrix or (a linking strategy
profile) L is a Nash equilibrium if for each country i ∈ n
and for any matrix Lˆ ∈ L in which the i-th row of Lˆ is
different from that of L,
τ(Lˆ) 4 τ(L) or equivalently Rˆ 4 R
Proposition 1. The game Σ = {C,L, τ,R,4} always has a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium L∗, where for i and j ∈ n,
lij = lji = adversary.
Proof of Proposition 1: Let L be such that for any two
countries in n, i and j,
lij = lji = adversary.
No country can unilaterally change any of its adversary
relations. Therefore, no one will deviate, and L is by
default a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
3.2 Dynamical System: Distributed Deviation
In this section we provide an opposite view to the static
game, which is a dynamical system, to study countries’
relation formation behaviors as a distributed, deviation
process.
Countries’ Deviations At time t + 1, each country
updates its own linking strategy based on the strategies
of others at time t. While updating its own strategy, each
country i ∈ n implicitly assumes that the strategies of all
other countries remain the same.
For simplicity, let the linking matrix at time t be Lu and
the linking matrix at time t+ 1 be Lv, where Lu, Lv ∈ L.
Set of Deviations from A Linking Matrix From Lu,
country i can only deviate to a subset of L, which we
define as i’s set of deviations from Lu and denote using
Liu, of which Lu is by default an element. In L
i
u, a linking
matrix that is not Lu is only different from Lu in terms of
the i-th row.
Individual Transition Probability Any country chooses
a time-invariant nonnegative probability called individual
transition probability with which to transition from a
linking matrix to another. Formally speaking, the map
ψi : L × L → [0, 1]
denotes country i’s transition probability from a linking
matrix to another.
If Lv is not in i’s deviation set from Lu, we stipulate
that ψi(u, v) = 0; otherwise, ψi(u, v) is a time-invariant
function of country i’s preferences for the relation config-
urations specified in the game Σ.
Linking Matrix Transition Probability Let the transition
probability matrix of the linking matrices be Z = [ζuv] ∈
[0, 1]|L|×|L| = [ζuv] ∈ [0, 1]
|3n(n−1)|×|3n(n−1)|, where ζuv
represents the transition probability from a linking matrix
u to another v. In this paper we focus on time-invariant
Z.
Deviation Order We turn to discuss how countries’ de-
viation order (i.e., asynchronous or synchronous) impacts
the way in which the individual transition probability from
Lu to Lv, ψi(Lu, Lv), aggregates to the linking matrix
transition probability from Lu to Lv, ζuv. Two possible
deviation orders are:
(1) Asynchronous Updating. The first deviation rule is
where only one country deviates at each time.
(a) Received Chance of Deviation. We suppose that
only one country is picked based on a nonnegative
probability ai to deviate at any time instant,
where the total probabilities for all countries
sum to 1 as below. The received chance for
country i to deviate can be a good proxy of its
relative capabilities in shaping the international
environments.
ai ∈ [0, 1], and
∑
i∈n
ai = 1
(b) Linking Matrix Transition Probability. The tran-
sition probability from Lu to Lv, ζuv, can be
expressed as
ζuv =
∑
i∈n
aiψi(u, v).
(2) Synchronous Updating. The second deviation rule
is where countries deviate simultaneously. We have
stipulated that each country assumes others’ choices
remain the same when it makes its own deviations.
This gives us a definition of “anticipated linking
matrix” below.
(a) Anticipated Linking Matrix By Each Country.
Let Lviu ∈ L
i
u represent the new linking matrix
anticipated by i when deviating from Lu, where
only its i-th row is the same as that of Lv, and
the rest of the n − 1 rows are the same as those
in Lu. Intuitively,
(i) If Lviu 6= Lv, the change from Lu to Lv
depends on country i changing the previous
linking strategy.
(ii) Otherwise, it does not.
(b) Linking Matrix Transition Probability. The tran-
sition probability from Lu to Lv, ζuv, is the
product of every country’s individual transition
probability from Lu to its anticipated linking
matrix Lviu ,
ζuv =
∏
i∈n
ψi(u, v
i
u).
Further Assumptions A country’s transition probability
between linking strategies can be assumed to satisfy the
following basic assumptions:
(1) We normalize the total probability of staying at
original linking matrices and transitioning to different
ones in either deviation to be 1.
In asynchronous updating,∑
Lv∈Liu
ψi(u, v) = 1.
In synchronous updating,∑
L
viu
∈Liu
ψi(u, v
i
u) = 1
(2) In either updating, if there does not exist another
linking matrix in country i’s deviation set mapped to
a strictly preferred relation configuration by τ than
the one mapped from Lu, we assume the probability
of staying at the original linking matrix to be 1.
If 6 ∃Lv ∈ L such that for country i, τ(Lv) ≺ τ(Lu),
then
ψi(u, v) = 0, ∀Lv ∈ L, Lv 6= Lu, and ψi(u, u) = 1
Otherwise,
ψi(u, v) > 0.
Deviation Process The deviation process is formalized
using:
(1) Initial Distribution. Countries can be regarded as
being initially involved in a distribution of all linking
matrices in L.
Denote the distribution of all the linking matrices
in L at time T as piT . piT = [piTu ]
1×|L|, where piTu ∈
[0, 1] representing the probability mass of staying in u
at time T , and ‖piT ‖1 = 1. Obviously, pi
0 = [pi0u]
1×|L|
represents the initial distribution.
(2) Deviation Process. The dynamical system is the col-
lection Ω = (Γ, pi0, Z}. Countries’ deviation process
can be conveniently understood as applying the oper-
ator Z (which is in fact a Markov operator) repeatedly
to the initial distribution, the vector pi0.
The Cesa`ro average as below
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
pi0Zk
represents the limiting distribution of the linking
matrices (and equivalently, of the relation configura-
tions) in the deviation process.
Convergence In this section we prove in Proposition 2
that Z is always a stochastic matrix. Then we know that
a stationary distribution always exists for Z, which will
give us predictions regarding the long run distribution
of linking matrices (or relation configurations) countries
involve in.
Proposition 2. In either asynchronous updating or syn-
chronous updating, every row of Z sums to 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: In asynchronous updating,
∑
Lv∈L
ζuv =
∑
Lv∈L
∑
i∈n
aiψi(u, v) =
∑
i∈n
ai
∑
Lv∈Liu
ψi(u, v)
Since
∑
Lv∈Liu
ψi(u, v) = 1, then we have
∑
Lv∈L
ζuv =
∑
i∈n
ai = 1
In synchronous updating,
∑
Lv∈L
ζuv =
∑
Lv∈L
∏
i∈n
ψi(u, v
i
u)
The above expression can be equivalently expressed as
∑
Lv∈L
∏
i∈n
ψi(u, v
i
u) =
∏
i∈n
∑
Lv∈Liu
ψi(u, v) = 1
Therefore, under both rules, every row of Z sums to 1. 
We know that an argument for any Markov Chain on finite
state space to have a stationary distribution is given by the
Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem. Therefore, this dynamical
system always has a stationary distribution.
4. LINKAGE WITH POWER ALLOCATION GAME
Let two power allocation games, which only differ in terms
of the relation configurations, R and Rˆ, be Γ(R) and
Γ(Rˆ). A reliable basis for a country’s preferences for R
and Rˆ is the outcomes from these two power allocation
games – for instance, this country will certainly prefer the
relation configuration in which it can survive (i.e., its total
support balancing out total threats) in the equilibria of the
respective power allocation game over the other in which
it cannot. Let their equilibrium sets be U and Uˆ .
Given country i, call Rˆ an “admissible alternative” to R
if rik = rˆik for all k ∈ n r {j} and ∀Uˆ ∈ Uˆ , ∀U ∈ U ,
xk(Uˆ) = xk(U).
Below we propose a set of the most intuitive and universal
criteria regarding countries’ preferences for relation con-
figurations, summarized below as “basic choice axioms”.
Basic Choice Axioms for (R,4i).We suppose that country
i has Rˆ and R with the former being an admissible
alternative to R, and introduce the following two axioms.
(1). Comparison along the self relation
Country i weakly prefers Rˆ over R, R 4 Rˆ if (∀Uˆ ∈ Uˆ ,
σi(Uˆ) ≥ τi(Uˆ)) ∨ (∀U ∈ U , σi(U) ≤ τi(U))
(2). Comparison along a friend/adversary relation
Country i weakly prefers Rˆ over R, R 4 Rˆ if
(1) if rij = rˆij = friend, and
(∀Uˆ ∈ Uˆ , σj(Uˆ) ≥ τj(Uˆ) ∨ (∀U ∈ U , σj(U) ≤ τj(U)
(2) if rij = rˆij = adversary, and
(∀Uˆ ∈ Uˆ , σj(Uˆ) ≤ τj(Uˆ) ∨ (∀U ∈ U , σj(U) ≥ τj(U)
(3) if rij = friend and rˆij = null:
(a) ∀U ∈ U , σj(U) ≤ τj(U).
(4) if rij = null and rˆij = friend:
(a) ∀Uˆ ∈ Uˆ , σj(Uˆ) ≥ τj(Uˆ).
(5) if rij = adversary and rˆij = null:
(a) ∀U ∈ U , σj(U) ≥ τj(U).
(6) if rij = null and rˆij = adversary:
(a) ∀Uˆ ∈ Uˆ , σj(Uˆ) ≤ τj(Uˆ).
(7) if rij = null and rˆij = null:
By default, R ∼ Rˆ
Now we suppose country i has two arbitrary Rˆ and R, and
introduce the last axiom.
(3) Comparison of the Relation Configurations
Country i weakly prefers Rˆ over R, R 4 Rˆ, if
(1) all of the respective conditions in (1) and (2) holds
for any j ∈ n.
Due to the linkage with the power allocation game, three
features of the basic choice axioms are:
First, by capturing only the most intuitive aspects in
countries’ preferences, these axioms only make possible a
partial order of the elements in R. However, a valid total
order that satisfy these axioms must exist, because the
axioms speak to mutually exclusive conditions.
Second, the axioms have considered the important fact in
reality that even when changing only a relation, a country
may cause elsewhere in the whole environment to change
as well, e.g., by influencing the power allocation outcomes
of other neighboring or even non-neighboring countries.
Third, despite not having directly specified, for instance,
how a country assesses the relation configurations in terms
of the relations among other countries, the axioms did
have suggested one way of doing so – these other countries’
relations among themselves could indirectly influence this
country’s preferences for the relation configurations by
directly influencing the power allocation outcomes of its
neighbors.
Proposition 3. Assume the basic choice axioms, if ∃i ∈ n
such that pi >
∑
j∈nr{i}
pj , which means that a “super-
power” does exist, a linking matrix L mapped to an
optimal relation configuration of i by τ , R˜, is a Nash
equilibrium of Σ = {C,L, τ,R,4}.
Proof of Proposition 3: When a superpower does exist,
i.e., ∃i ∈ n, pi >
∑
j∈nr{i}
pj ,
Suppose one maximal element of the totally ordered set
of relation configurations for i, which is one of its optimal
relation configuration, is R˜.
Note that R˜ must satisfy several properties.
(1) ∀j ∈ nr{i}, r˜ij 6= null. According to the basic choice
axioms, a null relation would be always weakly less
preferred than a friend relation with the friend being
safe or precarious or an adversary relation with the
adversary being unsafe or precarious.
(2) ∀j, k ∈ nr{i}, as mentioned earlier, r˜jk only matters
to i’s preferences if it affects the neighbors of i, all
else being equal.
Correspondingly, L satisfies the following.
(1) first, let L be the linking matrix, by which i de-
termines the relations with all the other countries
∀j ∈ n, ljj = self and lij = lji = r˜ij accordingly
to its optimal relation configuration.
(2) second, there are many possibilities for the relations
among countries other than i depending on i’s opti-
mal relation configuration. For any j, k ∈ n r {i},
let ljk = lkj if r˜jk = r˜kj = adversary, ljk = lkj
if r˜jk = r˜kj = friend, and ljk = lkj = null if
r˜jk = r˜kj = null.
i determines the states of all the other countries in the
equilibria of Σ. In any equilibrium, any friend of i will
always be safe or precarious, and any adversary of i will
be unsafe or precarious.
None of the countries in n r {i} can deviate from L. It
cannot unilaterally deviate from the adversary relations,
or change the null relation to a friend relation. And it
has no incentives to change a friend relation into a null
relation.
When a country other than i weakly prefers an adversary
relation over a friend or null relation, it must be that this
new adversary of itself is also an adversary of i but this
country itself is not i’s adversary. Therefore, this change
does not affect i’s power allocation outcomes. Therefore,
L still realizes an optimal relation configuration for i.
As argued above, none of the countries have incentives to
deviate, including i. Therefore, L is also a Nash equilir-
bium of Σ. 
5. APPLICATION
5.1 Alliance Politics: Cohesion and Effectiveness
An important prediction from the combination of both
games is that internal cohesion of countries in alliances
is the precondition for achieving any common goal with
power allocation. This is an issue usually absent from the
formal literature of alliances [Fordham and Poast, 2014,
Hiller, 2011, Smith, 1995, Snyder, 1997, Leeds, 2003a,
Morrow, 1991, Walt, 2000, Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966]).
For instance, Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) only applies to
a narrow subset of alliances that have resolved the internal
cohesion issue, such as NATO–the fact that NATO is
largely free of the issue of internal cohesion does not mean
every alliance would function equally well. A combination
of the static game of countries’ relation formation with the
game of countries’ power allocation provides some insights
into how certain powerful alliances can be both cohesive
and effective.
We present a discussion of “strong and bonded clique”
that has achieved both internal cohesion and effectiveness,
which actually provides a theoretical metaphor for NATO.
When this clique exists, we will prove in Theorem 1 that
it is really “reducible” into a single entity that sums
up the total power of all its component countries. By
“reducibility”, we mean that for countries outside of the
clique, the clique allocates power indistinguishably from
this single entity.
A strong and bonded clique can be defined as following: A
set of countries S ⊆ n is a strong and bonded clique if
(1) it is a “clique” in the sense that any two countries in
S are friends, ∀i, j ∈ S, rij = friend;
(2) it is strong in the sense that their total power exceeds
that of the rest of the countries, Σi∈Spi > Σj∈nrSpj ;
(3) it is united by bonds – every country in S shares
the same optimal relation configurations set R˜, where
every element in R˜ has them in the clique S.
A Game’s Reduced Form For two power allocation
games Γ = {C, p,U , σi, τi,X ,4} and Γ˜ = {C˜, p˜, U˜ , σi, τi, X˜ ,4
}, if there exists a surjection f : n → n˜ such that the
following holds
(1) Clique Members’ External Relations Condition: ∀i, j, h ∈
n s.t. f(i) = f(j) 6= f(h), rih = rjh.
(2) Equilibrium and State Condition: ∀k, l ∈ n˜, for every
equilibrium U of Γ, let u˜kl =
∑
i∈f−1(k)
∑
i∈f−1(l)
uij , U˜ is
an equilibrium of Γ˜. And ∀i, j ∈ n s.t. f(i) = f(j),
xi(U) = xj(U) = x˜fi(U˜) = x˜fi(U˜).
(3) Total Power Condition: ∀k ∈ n˜,
∑
i∈f−1(k)
pi = p˜k
Γ˜ is called a reduced form of Γ under f , especially in the
sense that one (or more) subset(s) of vertices in n can be
reduced into a single node, with the total power attached
to this single node being the sum of the power attached to
the vertices in the subset.
Theorem 1: Reducibility For two power allocation games
Γ = {C, p,U , σi, τi,X ,4} with a strong and bonded clique
S and Γ˜ = {C r S ∪ {s}, p˜, U˜ , σi, τi, S˜,4}, Γ˜ is a reduced
form of Γ under f : n→ n˜ if
(1) ∀i ∈ S, f(i) = s.
(2) ∀j ∈ nr S, f(j) = j.
(3) ∀i, j ∈ S, k ∈ nr S, rik = rjk = r˜sk.
(4)
∑
i∈S pi = ps.
5.2 Optimal Network Design: Static and Dynamical
In this section we show how a strong and bonded clique
can both induce a relation configuration optimal for itself
in the equilibrium of the static game, or gradually improve
the odds of being in optimal relation configurations in
the dynamical system, respectively in Proposition 4 and
Proposition 5.
Proposition 4. In game Σ = {C,L, τ,R,4} where the
parameters for the existence of a strong and bonded
clique S are satisfied and the basic choice axioms are
assumed to hold for countries’ preferences, an equilibrium
linking strategy profile L mapped to an optimal relation
configuration R by τ for countries in S, i.e., the clique
members, exists.
Proposition 5. In the dynamical system Ω = (Γ, pi0, Z},
if there exists a strong and bonded clique S ⊆ n, the
probability of playing the set of linking strategy profiles
Lˆ mapped to the optimal relation configuration set Rˆ by
τ for countries in S,
∑
Lp: τ(Lp)∈Rˆ
piTp weakly increase with
T , under the two deviation rules.
This “optimal network design” thesis speaks particularly
to the literature of unipolar politics [Ikenberry et al., 2011,
Wohlforth, 1999, Monteiro, 2014, Ikenberry et al., 2009,
Monteiro, 2011] on why the hegemon’s (the US’s) leader
status remains largely challenged.
Quite contrary to the literature which explains the status
quo as the product of the power preponderance of the
US, we suggest that the status quo may be instead by
design by the hegemon and certain other great powers,
such as by a strong and bonded clique. In particular, the
bonds are both necessary and sufficient for the identity
of the clique and that with the theory projected onto
the reality, liberal bonds hold the clique together in the
current world[Moravcsik, 1992, 1997, Oneal and Russet,
1997, Oneal et al., 1996, Doyle, 2005]. More precisely, the
strong and bonded clique actually abstracts for NATO
headed by the US in control of the contemporary world.
6. CONCLUSION
To summarize, in terms of the two models of the frame-
work of countries’ relation formation, the static game is
the simplest possible unifying model of countries’ relation
formation, while the second model of the dynamical sys-
tem really develops an view of the long-run processes of
countries’ relation formation from the perspective of an
outsider or an “impartial spectator”.
For future work, we will continue to explore more issues
of interest by combining countries’ power allocation and
relation formation, such as regarding alliances with differ-
ent levels of cohesion and effectiveness, and a hierarchy of
controls or influences different kinds of powerful entities
can exert over other countries.
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